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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act relies upon state governments for the 
implementation of some aspects of its provisions that are designed to expand access to health 
insurance. Differences in how parts of the law were implemented by state governments, along 
with different characteristics of the local private insurance market, allow us to measure the 
effectiveness of these policies and the importance of the private sector’s behavior. Previous 
research has confirmed that the law’s Medicaid expansion reduces the uninsured rate among 
the eligible population. This study expands upon this work through a regression model built on 
other local characteristics including state policy decisions around the ACA’s implementation and 
differences in the private insurance market. The model finds that the uninsured rate is lower in 
states which build their own Marketplace for individuals to shop for insurance, as well as in 
areas with less expensive insurance on the individual Marketplace. These findings have 
important implications for future policymaking that relies on decision making at the state level 




The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) represented the broadest 
overhaul of the American health insurance market and social safety net since the passage of 
Medicare 45 years earlier. Its passage was also highly contentious and politically charged, 
passed on partisan lines and representing a signature accomplishment of President Obama’s 
first term. The law’s significance to both health policy and to the political debate at the time of 
its passage led to considerable attention to its performance as well as challenges to some 
aspects of its implementation. A central policy goal of the ACA was the expansion of access to 
health insurance.  
A patchwork of policies was enacted to achieve this goal. All adults are now required to 
purchase health insurance or face a tax penalty, while health insurance companies are forbidden 
from denying insurance based on preexisting health conditions. The law has several provisions 
to help people with paying for insurance under the new mandate depending on their income 
level. Those with an income below 138% of the poverty line are covered in a nationwide 
expansion of Medicaid. Those with higher incomes but without coverage can shop for subsidized 
private plans on health insurance Exchanges built at the state level.  
Some of these provisions have faced challenges that have led to inconsistencies in its 
implementation between different states. The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius allowed states to refuse to participate in the 
Medicaid expansion, which 20 states have done. Additionally, only 22 states built their own 
Exchanges, with the rest relying on the federal government’s infrastructure including the 
HealthCare.gov website. The Marketplaces where individuals purchase insurance are also 
dependent upon the activities of private insurance companies. After losing money on the 
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Exchange health insurance plans when they were first offered in 2014 many private insurers 
raised their premium prices or removed their plans from the Marketplaces altogether. As a 
result, many consumers have limited choices when shopping for health insurance on the 
Exchanges or must pay more for insurance, which could limit the expansion of insurance 
coverage under the law at this income level. 
These variations in the law’s implementation across different states afford opportunities 
to measure the law’s effects by comparing what happens where there are differences in its 
implementation. This is important both for evaluating different policies under the ACA as well as 
for future policymaking efforts. While prior efforts to expand the social safety net involved 
universal, sometimes bureaucratic programs available to everyone, such as Social Security and 
Medicare, the ACA is means tested and involves a patchwork of different policies implemented 
by state governments and private companies. If such an effort is hurt when states undermine 
implementation or private companies do not find their participation profitable, then future 
policymaking should avoid such a structure. 
A wide body of research has already found that states which implemented the Medicaid 
expansion have lower uninsured rates, a finding that this study confirms. This includes increased 
enrollment among people that previously were eligible for Medicaid, suggesting that the 
increased publicity and news coverage of the program’s expansion leads people to “come out of 
the woodwork”. This effect may hold for other local characteristics related to support for the 
law or related to its implementation, such as the local political climate or the state government 
decision to build their own Marketplaces and advertise them.  
This study models these differences in state policy, as well as differences in the private 
insurance market, to measure the impact they have on the uninsured rate for individuals with 
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an income below 138% of the poverty line, the maximum for Medicaid eligibility under the law. 
Two models were run using county level data from 2015 and 2016. The analysis finds that, in 
addition to the Medicaid expansion, a state’s decision to build their own Marketplace results in 
an uninsured rate almost two percentage points higher than in states that do build a 
Marketplace. Differences in the private insurance market also have a statistically significant 
effect, as areas with more expensive average premiums lead to a higher uninsured rate. Other 
variables that were included in the second model, but proved not to have an effect on the 
uninsured rate, include the state governor’s party membership and whether the state’s officials 
joined the legal challenge against the law before the Supreme Court. While much of the 
opposition to the law was partisan, this suggests that the important factor in states 
implementing the law is the actual construction of programs such as the Exchanges, rather than 
softer measures of local attitudes.  
These findings confirm the importance of Medicaid in ensuring access to health 
insurance among low income individuals. It also shows that the insurance Marketplaces are 
effective at expanding access to private health insurance, but that this can also be harmed when 
private companies raise prices.  
The findings also suggest that constructing the Affordable Care Act in such a way that its 
success was dependent upon the cooperation of state policymakers and private companies may 
have hurt the law’s effectiveness at expanding health insurance access. Future efforts at 
expanding the social safety net may be better off with a more traditional program such as 
Medicare that everyone is eligible for, rather than the patchwork setup of the ACA that has left 
part of its success dependent upon other self-motivated actors.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A wide body of research seeks to measure the effect of different health insurance 
policies, both in terms of public and private coverage options. Recent work has been focused on 
the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its provisions, particularly because aspects of 
the law’s adoption have varied by state for significant reasons, including whether or not to 
accept the Medicaid expansion. Examining areas where the law’s adoption has varied is a useful 
way to measure its impact, as researchers can compare its performance in its ability to reduce 
the uninsured rate depending on what policies have been enacted in a given area. There is also 
some research prior to the law’s passage that bears relevance to current policy, as it tries to 
measure similar effects but with different laws. Comparing these studies to those done on the 
Affordable Care Act helps determine the external validity of ACA research to other potential 
policies made in the healthcare industry or to expand social welfare. 
One particularly important pre-ACA piece of research into the effect of Medicaid comes 
from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. Due to budgetary constraints Oregon closed new 
enrollment into Medicaid in 2004. In 2008 the state determined that it could afford to re-open 
enrollment, but not for everyone who would sign up, so the state conducted a random lottery to 
determine who could enroll. This lottery produced a natural, randomized experiment that 
allowed researchers to measure the effect of Medicaid availability on the population with 
regards to enrollment, health effects, health utilization, debt levels, and a whole host of other 
measures. With regards to enrollment, adults in this study who were selected in the random 
lottery were about 25 percentage points more likely to have health insurance during the study 
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period than those who were not.1 Lottery winners were not automatically enrolled in Medicaid, 
however many chose to do so. The study also found that this was not associated with any 
“crowding out” effect in the private insurance market,2 suggesting that Medicaid indeed 
expands access to health insurance from those that would otherwise go uninsured.  
After the ACA was enacted the states of California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and the 
District of Columbia chose to expand Medicaid earlier than required by the law, so these states 
became an early source of research into the law’s effects. While these states saw increased 
coverage from Medicaid due to the expansion, some secondary aspects of these expansions 
became important to keep in mind when examining state effects while implementing the 
Affordable Care Act. One was that in Connecticut, while there was an increase in Medicaid 
coverage, there was also a “crowding out” effect on private insurance, where new Medicaid 
enrollees came not from the uninsured but from those enrolled in private insurance who opted 
for cheaper coverage.3 The first to enroll in these states were also the sickest people, most in 
need of insurance and expensive care.4 This pattern would later become particularly important 
when applied nationally to the private insurance Marketplaces, where companies that receive 
an influx of sick patients are susceptible to high expenses and then needed to change their 
pricing model. 
 Another important conclusion from states that expanded early is that coverage 
increased among populations that were already eligible for Medicaid before its passage, not just 
                                                          
1 Finkelstein, Amy, Nathaniel Hendren, and Erzo F. P. Luttmer. The Value of Medicaid: Interpreting Results 
from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. Cambridge (2015): National Bureau of Economic Research. 
doi:10.3386/w21308. 1057. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Sommers, Benjamin D., Meredith Roberts Tomasi, Katherine Swartz, and Arnold M. Epstein. "Reasons for 
the Wide Variation in Medicaid Participation Rates among States Hold Lessons for Coverage Expansion in 




those whose income levels meant that it was newly available to them.5 This “coming out of the 
woodwork” effect could potentially be attributable to increased publicity for the state Medicaid 
program due to news coverage, advertising campaigns related to the expansion, and general 
word of mouth. Some of these factors may be more prominent in some states than others, and 
if they could be measured could hold some explanatory power over the outcome of states’ ACA 
implementations. One model of the effects of Medicaid expansion found that in non-expansion 
states citizens of counties closer to the border of another state with the expansion saw greater 
increases in Medicaid participation.6 While this study did not explore differences in this effect 
between states, it is possible that states which are more inclined to support these policies may 
have a stronger “coming out of the woodwork” effect. 
 These early states also had wide variation in the take-up rate, which is the percentage of 
the eligible population that enrolled in health insurance. Generally, states with liberal political 
leanings, which are more likely to offer generous Medicaid benefits, saw larger enrollment than 
conservative states. This effect goes away, however, when the generosity of benefits is 
controlled for, as states with more generous Medicaid benefits such as dental care see higher 
take-up rates. 7 This suggests that political leanings by themselves are not responsible for 
differences in take-up rate. 
 Since the implementation of the Affordable Care Act began in 2014 researchers have 
been able to more directly measure its effects, including the role of different provisions of the 
law in expanding coverage. Comprehensive modeling of American Community Survey data has 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 85. 
6 Clinton, Joshua D., and Michael W. Sances. “The Politics of Policy: The Initial Mass Political Effects of 
Medicaid Expansion in the States.” American Political Science Review 112 (2018). Cambridge University 
Press: 167–85. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000430. 11 
7 Sommers et. al. "Reasons for the Wide Variation in Medicaid Participation Rates among States Hold 
Lessons for Coverage Expansion in 2014." 912. 
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been able to quantify the effects that different policies have at the individual level. The 
provision of the law most important to reducing the uninsured rate is the Medicaid expansion, 
which explains about 60% of the reduction, the remainder coming from subsidies offered on 
insurance premiums for private insurance plans purchased on the Marketplace.8 About a third 
of that increase came from the “woodwork effect”, which “was evident in all states, whether or 
not they had expanded Medicaid, and occurred for both adults and children.”9  
 Further research has also found that different populations see larger reductions in the 
uninsured rate due to the Medicaid expansion. Cancer survivors, for instance, see greater 
coverage gains than adults without a cancer history.10 This aligns with the earlier research on 
the first states to expand which found that sicker individuals are more likely to enroll in 
Medicaid when given an opportunity.11 Coverage gains are largest among non-Hispanic whites, 
while weakest among Hispanics.12 
 A great deal of this research has focused on the results of the Affordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid expansion. These effects can be easier to identify, as it only involves one specific 
income level and one specific public program that is available throughout the country. There are 
also clear distinctions between states after the Supreme Court allowed some states to opt out of 
the Medicaid expansion. The individual private insurance market, however, is also an important 
                                                          
8 Frean, Molly, Jonathan Gruber, and Benjamin D. Sommers. "Premium Subsidies, the Mandate, and 
Medicaid Expansion: Coverage Effects of the Affordable Care Act." Journal of Health Economics 53 (2017): 
72-86. doi:10.1016. 5 
9 Ibid., 5-6 
10 Davidoff, Amy J., Gery P. Guy, Xin Hu, Felisa Gonzales, Xuesong Han, Zhiyuan Zheng, Helen Parsons, 
Donatus U. Ekwueme, and Ahmedin Jemal. "Changes in Health Insurance Coverage Associated with the 
Affordable Care Act among Adults with and without a Cancer History." Medical Care 56 (2018): 220-227. 
doi:10.1097. 
11 Sommers et. al. "Reasons for the Wide Variation in Medicaid Participation Rates among States Hold 
Lessons for Coverage Expansion in 2014." 912. 
12 Yue, Dahai, Petra W. Rasmussen, and Ninez A. Ponce. "Racial/Ethnic Differential Effects of Medicaid 
Expansion on Health Care Access." Health Services Research (2018). doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12834. 8. 
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pillar of the Affordable Care Act’s efforts to expand coverage, and also has a great deal of 
variation from state to state. These efforts included the creation of the state Marketplaces and 
setting aside funds for subsidies for insurance premiums to make insurance affordable. 
Ultimately there became a great deal of state-to-state variation in the implementation of this 
aspect of the law, as many states chose not to build their own Exchanges and others struggled 
to have functioning Exchanges in their first year. Further variation comes from differences in the 
private companies that offer insurance in different areas. This means that consumers face a big 
difference in the cost of insurance depending on where they live, which could be a source of 
variation in the uninsured rate. 
More generally, qualitative research has shown there is a great deal of state-to-state 
variation in the private health insurance market to begin with, and this has continued in the 
Marketplaces. Health insurance is largely dependent upon building a network of health care 
providers, which is a particularly localized feature.13 The cost of private insurance is also highly 
dependent on the cost and availability of these local providers. In areas with a small number of 
hospitals or providers, particularly rural areas, the lack of competition can force insurers to 
accept higher provider prices, which in turn get passed on to consumers who purchase 
insurance.14 In the case of the Exchanges many of the initial enrollees were sicker, much like in 
Medicaid expansions, and therefore more expensive to insure, which threw off the pricing 
models of insurers accustomed to healthier populations in the employer-based insurance 
market. 
                                                          
13 Morrisey, M. A., Rivlin, A. M., Nathan, R. P. and Hall, M. A. “Five-State Study of ACA Marketplace 
Competition: A Summary Report.” Risk Management and Insurance Review, 20 (2017): 153-172. 
doi:10.1111/rmir.12079. 2 
14 Ibid. 4 
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Many health insurance companies that entered the individual Marketplace found that, 
partially as a result of these factors, they experienced heavy financial losses on the Exchanges. 
Aetna and UnitedHealthcare, two of the largest national private insurance companies, withdrew 
from the Exchanges prior to 2017 after experiencing heavy financial losses.15 From 2016 to 2017 
the number of insurers on the Exchanges fell by half.16 Some states only have one or two 
companies offering insurance to individuals on the Exchanges, and limited competition like this 
could also lead to price increases. 
Put together, there are a variety of factors that create state-to-state variation in the 
private Exchange Marketplaces. There are parts of the country where states have built well-
functioning Exchanges with robust competition among insurers which have a wide range of 
providers to fill their networks. In other states there may be a poorly run Exchange or only one 
company offering insurance that is only available at high premiums. Research that tries to 
determine the ACA’s impact on the insurance rate has, up until this point, been focused on 
differences between states due to the Medicaid expansion. Examining the role that these 
differences in the private individual Marketplaces play could yield more insight into the effects 
of the law and similar programs, and would also inform future policymaking that could be 
dependent upon the actions of state governments or private companies. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
Two multivariate OLS models were developed consisting of a variety of local factors 
related to implementation of the Affordable Care Act. The dependent variable in both models 
was the uninsured rate among individuals whose income was at 138% of the poverty line or 
                                                          
15 Graves, John A. and Craig Garthwaite. "Success and Failure in the Insurance Exchanges." The New 




lower, as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). This part of 
the population is most sensitive to ACA policies, as it consists of the population eligible for 
Medicare under the ACA expansion and those most sensitive to differences in the private 
insurance marketplace. Independent variables come in two broad categories, differences in 
statewide policies in implementing the Affordable Care Act and differences in characteristics of 
the private insurance market.  
 The dataset was compiled on the county level using data from 2015 and 2016. ACS data 
for 2017 was not available at the time of analysis. This limits the model’s ability to measure the 
effect of the number of health insurance companies, as it was prior to 2017’s enrollment that 
many companies dropped out of the Marketplaces and many counties had just one insurer. The 
analysis was also conducted looking just at each year, 2015 and 2016, and the outcome did not 
vary substantially between the two years. Several variables were only available or relevant at 
the statewide level and therefore did not vary by county. 
 State-specific characteristics were researched and chosen with the goal of measuring 
the state’s support or hostility towards the law and its implementation. Some of these factors 
involved the expansion or implementation of programs, including the state’s decision on 
whether to enact the Medicaid expansion or build a local Exchange rather than rely on 
Healthcare.gov. Other characteristics meant to measure the climate surrounding the law include 
the party of the state’s governor, as a proxy measure of the local political environment, and 
whether state officials joined the Supreme Court lawsuit challenging the act. While these 
characteristics all measure some aspect of the state government’s feeling towards the law, 
some may be more relevant than others. It could be that some states were opposed to the law 
before the Court but did not want to pass up the opportunity at increased Medicaid funds. This 
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analysis attempts to determine which of these state policy factors is ultimately important in 
expanding insurance access. 
3.1 State Characteristics Compiled for Model 
 After the passage of the Affordable Care Act and the Supreme Court’s decision to allow 
states to choose not to participate in the law’s Medicaid expansion, the extent to which a state 
could enact aspects of the ACA varied. While the framers of the law originally envisioned each 
state building their own Exchanges where individuals could buy health insurance, many states 
opted to let the federal government do it, using the Federally Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) 
featuring the website, HealthCare.gov. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the distribution of which 
states chose to expand Medicaid and which built their own Exchanges as of 201617. 
Before the law’s implementation 27 states18 joined a lawsuit challenging its 
constitutionality before the Supreme Court. This decision is incorporated into the model as a 
proxy measure of whether state government supported the law upon its passage and prior to its 
implementation, which could mean that they were less likely to promote its enaction or provide 
extensive benefits when doing so.  
                                                          
17 While Figure 1 and Table 1 depict state policies as of 2016, the regression model’s 2015 data varied 
slightly as Montana only enacted the Medicaid Expansion as of January 1, 2016. Louisiana enacted the 
expansion as of July 1, 2016, and for the purpose of this analysis was categorized as not expanding, as 
most enrollment happens at the start of the year. For a full breakdown of these state-specific 
characteristics see the Appendix. 
18 In Iowa and Washington the Governor and Attorney General joined opposite sides of the lawsuit. For 




Source: Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts. https://www.kff.org/state-category/health-reform/  
Table 1: ACA Participation by State 
State Policy Choices  
Expanded Medicaid, Built Exchange 21 states and District of Columbia 
Expanded Medicaid, Used Healthcare.gov (FFM) 9 states 
No Medicaid Expansion, Built Exchange 1 state 
No Medicaid Expansion, Used Healthcare.gov (FFM) 19 states 
 Partisanship could be another potential factor in the law’s support, as it was largely 
passed on partisan grounds and later became a major campaign topic in the 2010 midterms and 
2012 Presidential election. Republican governors who opposed the law in the first place or don’t 
want to see it succeed for political reasons may have done less to promote the new programs 
than others. To measure this potential partisan effect the dataset includes the party of the state 
Governor in the measurement year. This was converted to a binary variable with a value of 1 for 
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Democrats and 0 for Republicans (no state had an Independent or third party governor in the 
measurement period).  
 After the law’s passage states could also build their own State Based Marketplaces 
(SBMs) where individuals without insurance from their employer and small business employees 
could shop for health insurance plans. States that did not do so defaulted to the Federally 
Facilitated Marketplace (FFM) operated by the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Some states had a hybrid model of either an SBM on the Federal Platform, where the state 
performed all functions except for using the Healthcare.gov IT platform, or a State-Partnership 
Marketplace where the state only managed plans and administered customer service. For the 
purpose of this analysis and in Figure 1 above the hybrid categories were categorized with State 
Based Marketplaces; they largely had the same effect on the uninsured rate and separating 
them out did not meaningfully increase the explanatory power of the model, as demonstrated in 
Figure 3 in the Results section. A full listing of how all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
where categorized for these characteristics can be found in the Appendix. 
3.2 Private Insurance Market Characteristics 
 Two aspects of each state’s private insurance market were included in the analysis: the 
monthly cost of insurance premiums and the number of companies offering insurance policies in 
that county. Premium costs were defined at as the second-least expensive silver metal level 
premium for a 40-year-old as compiled and analyzed by the Kaiser Family Foundation.19 This 
calculation was conducted at the state level and applied to all counties in the state. County level 
                                                          
19 Premiums can vary drastically according to benefits offered, age, and a host of other potential factors; 
this measure is designed to capture a “typical” plan available to consumers. 
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data on premiums is available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) but 
only for states on the Federally Facilitated Marketplace, so it was not used for this analysis.  
A health insurance issuer was defined as a single company offering health insurance on 
the individual Marketplace, irrespective of the number of individual plans or networks they 
offered. For example, if Blue Cross offered 5 PPO plans and 8 HMO plans in a county across 4 
different metal levels with varying premiums and deductibles, they would still count as just one 
issuer. These counts were computed using the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s HIX Compare 
datasets, which includes data on which health plans are offered in which county on the 
Exchange Marketplaces across the United States.  
4. RESULTS 
 Two models were produced. Model 2 includes all variables described above, whereas 
Model 1 only includes variables that are statistically significant at the 95% level. The extra 
variables found only in Model 2 and therefore without a meaningful effect on the uninsured rate 
are the partisanship of the state governor and whether the state chose to challenge the 
Affordable Care Act before the Supreme Court. Neither variable was statistically significant and 
their inclusion did not meaningfully contribute to the model’s explanatory power; the two 





Table 2: Model Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: Uninsured Rate for Individuals Below 138% of the Poverty Line 
N = 1,631 
Model 1 R2= .4375 
Model 2 R2= .4373 
Variable Model 1 coefficients 
(p value) 
Model 2 coefficients 
(p value) 


















Did state officials choose to challenge the 
ACA before the Supreme Court? 
 0.35 
(.27) 
Is the state governor a Democrat?  -.04 
(.88) 
Constant 19.75 19.77 
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 95% level 
** Coefficient is statistically significant at the 99% level 
†Premium Cost is defined at as the second-lowest cost silver (benchmark) premium for a 40-year-old as compiled and 
analyzed by the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
4.1 Impact of State Policy Characteristics 
Previous research has shown that the Medicaid expansion is strongly associated with a 
drop in the uninsured rate, and that conclusion held in this analysis. Enacting the Medicaid 
expansion meant a drop of 8.4% in the uninsured rate of this population. The uninsured rate by 




In addition to the important role Medicaid plays, states using the Federally Facilitated 
Marketplace see nearly a 2% higher uninsured rate in the model. Figure 3 compares the 
uninsured rate for counties in FFM states to those in the other 3 Marketplace categories which 




By comparing the two models we can determine which state characteristics mattered 
the most in reducing the uninsured rate. Ultimately the models show that state decisions to 
build or expand programs had a real effect to bring down the uninsured rate. Both of these 
variables involve an active expansion of the state government, with funding and a marketing 
effort to bring a new service to the population. The other variables considered in Model 2, while 
they may correlate with these factors and be a signal of the local political environment and 
attitudes surrounding the law, do not ultimately matter regarding the state’s ability to expand 
insurance.  
4.2 Impact of Private Insurance Market Characteristics 
Both private market variables had a significantly significant impact on the uninsured rate 
at the 95% confidence interval, but with a less significant relationship than the state policy 
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variables. The model found that a $100 increase in monthly premiums leads to a 0.8% increase 
in the uninsured rate. Figure 4 is a scatterplot of this relationship. A few counties are outliers 
with significantly higher premiums. These are all located in Alaska, where healthcare is 
significantly more expensive than in the rest of the country.  
 
 
Counties with more issuers saw a higher uninsured rate. This is somewhat 
counterintuitive, as more issuers would imply more competition in the individual market. This 
relationship may not hold, however, should this analysis be conducted using data from 2017, 
when many counties only one or no issuers offering insurance, when it becomes available. Such 
monopoly situations could lead to substantially higher costs that could increase the uninsured 




This model demonstrates that the decisions that state governments made in 
implementing the Affordable Care Act played an important role in how effective it was at 
expanding access to health insurance. A state that chose to both expand Medicaid and build its 
own Exchange Marketplace would, according to the model, see its uninsured rate among poor 
citizens drop by over 10%. Both policies are shown to be effective ways to expand access to 
health insurance. 
In many states these were politically charged decisions, with some Republican 
governors going against party doctrine to institute one or both policies. Comparing these two 
models demonstrates that instituting these programs worked to expand insurance access, 
regardless of the local political environment. This finding agrees with earlier research which 
found that political factors had no impact on the take up rate for health insurance factors 
around the generosity of benefits were controlled for. 
The availability of private insurance is another source of variation in people’s ability to 
access health insurance after the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Prior to 2017 many health 
insurance companies, including two of the largest companies in UnitedHealthcare and Aetna, 
dropped out of the Marketplaces. Many places now have only one insurer with an effective 
monopoly on the individual Marketplace. Unfortunately, this analysis could not explore the 
effect that this shift had, as county level American Community Survey data was only available 
through 2016. This analysis was also limited in its ability to fully capture the potential price and 
monopolist effects from the private insurance market as there is no clean dataset on this market 
available for the entire country. While the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services does 
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publish clean datasets on all plans offered on Healthcare.gov, this is limited to states in the 
Federally Facilitated Marketplaces and therefore limits comparisons to other states.  
Ultimately this analysis found that more insurers actually increase the uninsured rate. 
It’s possible that this effect would go away or be reversed when data from 2017 and 2018 is 
included with many examples of counties with one or no insurers. It’s also possible that with the 
inclusion of cost in the analysis this effect would go away, as that would capture monopolists’ 
potential price increases.  
Still, this analysis shows that private market factors, including price, do impact the 
uninsured rate, which speaks to the important consideration of the law’s reliance upon private 
companies in attempting to expand insurance access. Alternative proposals at the time of the 
laws passage included expansions of Medicare and including a government sponsored health 
insurance plan on the individual Marketplaces. These policy options would have left ACA 
supporters less reliant upon the private market to expand insurance access. Future efforts to 
expand insurance coverage and the social safety net would do well to keep this in mind when 
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APPENDIX: STATE CHARACTERISTICS USED IN MODEL 
State Supreme Court Case Position Type of Exchange Marketplace Medicaid Expansion  Governor’s Party 
Alabama Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Alaska Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted in 2016 Democrat 
Arizona Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
Arkansas No position State-based Marketplace-Federal Platform Adopted Democrat 
California Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Colorado Challenged State-based Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Connecticut Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
Delaware Supported State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
District of Columbia Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
Florida Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Georgia Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Hawaii Supported Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
Idaho Challenged State-based Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Illinois Supported State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Indiana Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Iowa Challenged and Supported State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Kansas Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Kentucky No position State-based Marketplace-Federal Platform Adopted Republican 
Louisiana Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Democrat 
Maine Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Maryland Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Massachusetts Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Michigan Challenged State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Minnesota No position State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
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Mississippi Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Missouri No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Montana No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted in 2016 Democrat 
Nebraska Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Nevada Challenged State-based Marketplace-Federal Platform Adopted Republican 
New Hampshire No position State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
New Jersey No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
New Mexico Supported State-based Marketplace-Federal Platform Adopted Republican 
New York Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
North Carolina No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Democrat 
North Dakota Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Ohio Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Oklahoma No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Oregon Supported State-based Marketplace-Federal Platform Adopted Democrat 
Pennsylvania Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
Rhode Island No position State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
South Carolina Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
South Dakota Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Tennessee No position Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Texas Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Utah Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
Vermont Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Virginia Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Democrat 
Washington Challenged and Supported State-based Marketplace Adopted Democrat 
West Virginia No position State-Partnership Marketplace Adopted Republican 
Wisconsin Challenged Federally-facilitated Marketplace Not Adopted Republican 
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